Since the end of the War of 1812, slave and free states had been added alternately to the union, thus easing the fear of both northerners and southerners that one section of the country would gain the upper hand in the Senate. In 1844 the sections were evenly divided with thirteen free states and thirteen slave states. The annexation of Texas, as well as the pending statehood of Florida, would have given the slave states a majority in the Senate. (See Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 147–160, 742, 836.)

Howe, Daniel Walker. What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815–1848. The Oxford History of the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

The Mexican government still laid claim to Texas and made it clear that it would view the annexation of Texas by the United States as an act of aggression. When rumors reached Mexico in summer 1843 that the United States Congress might attempt to pass legislation annexing the Republic of Texas, José Maria de Bocanegra, Mexican secretary of state for foreign relations and government, wrote a letter to Waddy Thompson, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico. Bocanegra warned Thompson that “the Mexican Government will consider equivalent to a declaration of war against the Mexican Republic the passage of an act for the incorporation of Texás with the territory of the United States.” (Public Documents Printed by Order of the Senate of the United States, 28th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 5, no. 341, pp. 89–90.)

Public Documents Printed by Order of the Senate of the United States, Third Session of the Twenty-Fifth Congress. . . . Washington: Blair and Rives, 1839.

On 12 April 1844, President John Tyler and Secretary of State John C. Calhoun secured a treaty with representatives from the Republic of Texas whereby Texas would convey its “separate and independent sovereignty and jurisdiction to the United States.” Tyler secretly submitted the treaty to the United States Senate for its ratifying vote on 22 April 1844. The Senate did not remove Tyler’s injunction of secrecy on the treaty until 15 May 1844. Beginning the day the treaty was signed, however, news of it was widely reported. (Public Documents Printed by Order of the Senate of the United States, 28th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 5, no. 341, pp. 3–13; “Texas Treaty,” Daily Madisonian [Washington DC], 12 Apr. 1844, [2]; “The Texas Question,” Evening Post [New York City], 16 Apr. 1844, [2].)

Public Documents Printed by Order of the Senate of the United States, Third Session of the Twenty-Fifth Congress. . . . Washington: Blair and Rives, 1839.

Daily Madisonian. Washington DC. 1841–1845

Evening Post. New York City. 1801–.

Gaines had been in Washington DC for months because he and his wife had an inheritance case pending before the United States Supreme Court that was rumored to be worth in excess of $15 million. In addition, Gaines’s longstanding feud with the commanding general of the United States Army, Winfield Scott, had led supporters of Gaines in Congress to sponsor a bill designed to reorganize the army to grant Gaines a higher rank. On 16 April 1844, Gaines won a partial victory as President John Tyler reorganized the army into eastern and western divisions and assigned Gaines the western command, though still as Scott’s subordinate. Gaines’s departure for his new headquarters in New Orleans fueled newspaper rumors that he was being ordered there as part of secret negotiations with Texas over annexation. Two days before Hyde wrote this letter, the political correspondent of a Philadelphia newspaper wrote of the belief among many in Washington that Gaines’s “late departure West is connected with the Texas movement; that he is to lead down a force that shall be ready to act in that quarter; and that he is instructed to assist the Texans, if invaded.” Such reports were rendered more plausible given Gaines’s history in the Texas-Mexico conflict. During the rebellion of Texas against Mexico, Gaines had occupied Nacogdoches, Texas, in July 1836 with United States forces on the pretext of quelling a cross-border Indian disturbance. Hundreds of Gaines’s troops then reportedly “deserted” to Sam Houston’s Texian forces. (“A Pair of Millionaires,” New York Herald [New York City], 24 Feb. 1844, [2]; Fry, History and Legal Effect of Brevets, 128–130; “Washington Correspondence,” North American and Daily Advertiser [Philadelphia], 4 Jan. 1844, [2]; “Army General Orders,” Daily National Intelligencer [Washington DC], 27 Apr. 1844, [2]; “Washington Correspondence,” North American and Daily Advertiser, 26 Apr. 1844, [2]; Nance, After San Jacinto, 16–17.)

New York Herald. New York City. 1835–1924.

Fry, James B. The History and Legal Effect of Brevets in the Armies of Great Britain and the United States from Their Origin in 1692 to the Present Time. New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1877.

North American and Daily Advertiser. Philadelphia. 1839–1845.

Daily National Intelligencer. Washington DC. 1800–1869.

Nance, Joseph Milton. After San Jacinto: The Texas-Mexican Frontier, 1836–1841. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1963.

In the United States, Santa Anna was known as a dramatic aggressor during the Texas Revolution. As the head of the Mexican army, Santa Anna led Mexican forces in their siege during the Battle of the Alamo, which resulted in unnecessarily high casualties on both sides. He also ordered the execution of over 350 captured Texians in what became known as the Goliad massacre. After his defeat and capture at the Battle of San Jacinto, he agreed to withdraw Mexican forces to the south of the Rio Grande, which Texians viewed as a recognition of their independence. The Mexican government, however, did not recognize this agreement as valid. (See Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 663–665, 667–669.)

Howe, Daniel Walker. What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815–1848. The Oxford History of the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.